When two causes join in causing injury, one of which is insured against, insured is covered by policy. Zimmerman v. Continental Life Ins. Co. (App. 1 Dist. 1929) 99 Cal.App. 723, 279 P. 464. Insurance 2590(1)

Under an insurance policy covering death from bodily injuries, which independently of all other causes are effected solely and exclusively by accidental means, if disease plays a part in the death of insured after an accident, it is essential to recovery on the policy that such disease was due to the accident. Clarke v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. (1919) 180 Cal. 76, 179 P. 195. Insurance 2589(1)

In an action under policy covering death by accidental means exclusively, where it appeared that insured was struck by an automobile resulting in concussion of the brain, and consequently developed appendicitis and heart disease, evidence sustained finding that proximate cause of death was concussion of brain. Clarke v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. (1919) 180 Cal. 76, 179 P. 195. Insurance 2607

If an accident was the proximate cause of drowning of insured, the nature of accident was immaterial on the question of liability on an accident policy. Kinsey v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California (1918) 178 Cal. 153, 172 P. 1098. Insurance 2590(1)

 

Under accidental death and injury policy covering loss directly caused by firing, misfiring, explosion or malfunction of rockets, missiles or their respective fueling systems or any related accident, the term "directly caused" was fairly synonymous with the term proximately caused. O'Doan v. Insurance Co. of North America (App. 3 Dist. 1966) 52 Cal.Rptr. 184, 243 Cal.App.2d 71. Insurance 2590(1)

 

Under policy providing benefits for death resulting directly from bodily injury resulting through accidental means, pre-existing disease would not relieve insurer from liability if accident were proximate cause of death; and beneficiary could recover even though diseased condition appeared actually to contribute to cause of death if accident set in progress a chain of events leading directly to death. Happoldt v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (App. 1 Dist. 1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 386, 203 P.2d 55. Insurance 2589(1)

Under accident policy containing double indemnity provision, but providing that policy should not cover injury or death caused wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by disease or mental infirmity, the presence of pre-existing disease or infirmity does not relieve insurer from liability if accident is proximate cause of death, and recover may be had on policy even though a diseased or infirm condition appears to actually contribute to cause death if accident sets in progress the chain of events leading directly to death. Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 305, 163 P.2d 689. Insurance 2589(1)

That insured was suffering from incurable cancer and was under influence of narcotics given to relieve pain, and because of his weakened condition he may have been less able than a normal person to withstand effect of injuries sustained in burning of building, did not preclude finding that proximate cause of his death was burns received in a fire of accidental origin, within double indemnity clause of accident policy providing that policy should not cover death caused wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by disease or mental infirmity or medical or surgical treatment therefor. Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 305, 163 P.2d 689. Insurance 2589(1)

Under an insurance policy covering death by accidental means exclusively, if the death of the insured was in part caused by heart disease, which was not in fact caused by the accident, there could be no recovery. Clarke v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. (1919) 180 Cal. 76, 179 P. 195. Insurance 2589(2)


West's Ann.Cal.Ins.Code § 10320